Abstract-A model of distributed computation is proposed in which processes may fail by not sending or receiving the messages specified by a protocol. The solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem for this model is presented. Our algorithm exhibits early stopping under conditions of less than maximum failure and is as efficient -as the algorithms developed for the more restrictive crash-fault -model in terms of time, message, and bit complexity. We show extant models to underestimate resiliency when faults in the communication medium are considered; the model of this paper is more accurate in this regard.
I. INTRODUCTION
G IVEN is a collection of n distributed, potentially faulty processes able to communicate only by messages. Desired is a protocol which allows all processes in the collection to agree on a value m chosen by a distinguished process General. The desired protocol is said to solve the Byzantine Generals Problems if it satisfies the following constraints.
Validity: If General does not fail, then all nonfaulty processes agree on m.
Agreement: All nonfaulty processes agree on a common value.
The Byzantine Generals Problem has been explored extensively, under varying types of failures [1] - [3] , [5] , [6] , [8] , [10] - [ 12] . In the most restrictive model of failure, faulty processes may only crash, that is, a process fails only by halting. Malicious failures are the least restrictive. In this model failed processes may not only deviate from the protocol but actively collude with one another in an attempt to prevent agreement.
Experience dictates that process failures are rarely of the type associated with either of the extremes described above. Previous work has attempted to bring the crashfault model in greater conformity with reality by broadening the types of process failure. Reference [4] allows processes to continue executing following failure; his only restriction is that a faulty process sends no false (relative to the protocol) messages. However, a faulty process may omit sending messages at will. In' [4] is translated into crash-fault behavior at the cost of additional bit complexity. This paper lessens the failure restrictions yet again. Processes in our model may fail not only in the sending of messages, but in the receiving as well. Stated another way, a faulty process can halt prematurely, or fail to send or receive any message required by the protocol. Clearly, we have the seeds of malicious behavior: a faulty process is now able to generate messages independent of those transmitted by the correct processes. Therefore we impose restrictions: a failed process may refuse to send or receive any message called for by the protocol; however, any messages transmitted must be correct relative to the protocol and the set of messages accepted. We shall make these restrictions more precise in a subsequent section.
There are several reasons for pursuing this model of failure. First, it is another step toward a more realistic model of process failure. Additionally, most existing protocols assume that no messages are lost. This assumption is commonly rationalized by declaring that a missing message may be accounted for by arbitrarily attributing the loss to a fault of either the sender or receiver. We will show that doing so severely underestimates the resiliency of the collection of processes. In our model, the fault may be laid squarely on the shoulders of the process committing the fault. When a message specified by the protocol is not successfully transmitted and received, itis either because a faulty sender did not transmit it or a faulty receiver failed to receive it. (For example, in practice a message can be lost because the sender was tardy or the receiver had no available buffer.) Thus, our model is an extension of that proposed by [4] (which includes crashfault behavior as well). Moreover, our solutions are as efficient in time, message, and bit complexity as those previously proposed for the most restrictive type of failure (crash-faults). Hence, our results demonstrate that less restrictive failure assumptions do not always entail greater expense.
II. THE MODEL Let P be the set {P 1, P2, • • • ,Pn} of processes participating in the protocol. Assume that a distinguished process General E P wants to transmit a binary value m to all others. (Efficient methods for converting a binary-valued Byzantine Generals protocol to one which works for arbitrary values may be found in [9] and [13] A protocol <I> is a collection of functions, one per process, which map the view of a process in each phase into messages to be sent. Let <I>f( j) represent the function which maps Pi'S view through phase R -1 into the message which <I> dictates Pi send to P, in phase R. We use J-lf (j) to denote this message:
We say that process Pi commits a send-fault with respect to process P j in phase R if sentf (j) *-J-lf( j). Similarly, Pi is said to commit a receive-fault with respect to process P j in phase R if received'[t j i *-sentf(i).
If processes were allowed to commit arbitrary send and receive faults, our model would encompass completely malicious behavior. For example, by committing receivefaults with respect to all processes in every phase, process Pi would be able to act without regard to the desires of the other processes (as communicated by their messages).
Likewise may be said if Pi may commit malicious sendfaults. We therefore impose the following restrictions on faulty behavior.
Send-Fault Restriction:
Receive-Fault Restriction:
In other words, a process may refuse to send or receive any message; however, only ¢ (denoting the missing message) may be substituted for a proper message.
Let FAULTY-SENDERS R be the set of processes which have committed send-faults in any phase up to and including R. FAULTY-RECEIVERS R is analogously defined for receive-faults. That is,
FAULTY-SENDERS
The ability of a faulty process to deviate from its protocol is what makes Byzantine Agreement difficult to achieve. We bound the number of faulty processes by a constant,
Like most other work in this area, we shall assume that the processes communicate through a completely connected, perfectly reliable message system in which all messages are correctly delivered. Processes are the only source of failure in our model. Thus, if in phase R process Pi commits no send fault with respect to P j and if P j commits no receive fault with respect to Pi, then
In light of our model of process failure, the message system reliability assumption is not unduly restrictive.
Suppose a phase R message from process Pi to process P j is not delivered due to a failure of the message system.
We can model the failure as follows: if sentf(j) *-¢, then interpret the lost message as a fault on the part of Pj' otherwise as a fault of the sender. Thus the fault is properly attributed to its source.
Finally, we say that process Pi has decided as soon as decision, E {a, 1, NIL}.
III. THE BASIC ALGORITHM
A (t + 1) phase algorithm which solves the Byzantine Generals Problem is presented in Fig. 1 . The basic idea is as follows: since processes are not malicious, any value received must be m. Hence, upon first receiving a value, process Pi decides and relays m to all other processes.
Should no value be received by the end of the last phase, a process decides on NIL, indicating that General failed.
A. Correctness of the Basic Algorithm
Correctness of the basic algorithm is proved in this section. We begin by introducing some definitions which facilitate the proof.
Define QUIET f to be the set of processes from whom Pi has failed to receive a message in some phase up to and including R. Formally we define QUIET f as follows: let ES R denote those processes eligible to send messages in phase R. This is simply This is the set of processes that Pi perceives to be faulty.
(If Pi is nonfaulty, this set in fact contains only faulty processes.)
Let FAULTY-RELAYERS R for R < (t + 1) be the set of processes which have received m and failed to relay it to all other processes by the end of phase R. That is,
By definition, received~eneral (General) == m. This makes General a member of FA ULTY-RELAYERS 1 if it does not complete its initial broadcast without failing. Observe that
FAULTY-RELAYERS R~F AULTY-SENDERS R.
The conditions under which one process decides on m while another remains undecided are the subject of the next lemma. It states the number of failures which must occur in order for this situation to arise. This lemma will be invoked repeatedly when we determine whether m is still a potential decision value for an undecided process. For the case when R == (t + 1), let P, be the process that sent m to Pi. Then P, must first have decided on m in phase t . We invoke Lemma 3.1 which tells us that there must have been at least t processes in FAULTY-RELAYERSt (and hence also inFAULTY-SENDERS t). By assumption this is the maximum number of send-faults which may occur. Therefore, P j commits no send fault in phase (t + 1). Hence all undecided P; ¢ FAULTY-RECEIVERS(t+ I) receive m from P, and reach the same decision as Pi. D Observe that no limit was placed on the number of receive-faults. Thus it can be seen that any model in which receive-faults count in the number of faults tolerated underestimates resiliency to failure. Stated another way, our algorithm renders receive-faults benign, therefore their number need not be bounded.
FAULTY-RECEIVERS(t +
It is easy to explain why only send-faults are relevant. Suppose some process P j commits a receive fault with respect to Pi in phase R. Consider the message sentf(j) which is missed. If sentf(j) = (jJ, then P, has unwittingly followed the protocol. If instead sentf(j) = m, then there are two cases to review. When the sender Pi commits no send-fault, all nonfaulty processes receive and decide on m; hence, agreement is achieved in spite of Pj's failure. If the sender's transmission is faulty, let us just assume that sentf( j) = cP and the above proof is still correct. We have thus shown our algorithm to be impervious to receive-faults.
Note that not all algorithms that are resilient to sendfaults are able to tolerate receive-faults as well. For example, the early-stopping algorithm of [4] does not extend to receive-faults. A simple extension to our algorithm which exhibits early stopping if fewer than t sendfaults actually occur is the topic of the next section.
IV . EARLY STOPPING
The algorithm of Fig. 1 is modified in order to permit processes to halt immediately after deciding. We will show that if f < t send-faults take place, then all processes will have halted by the end of phase (f + 2). Thus, the cost (in number of phases) of fault-tolerance is in direct proportion to the number of send-faults which actually occur. The early-stopping protocol is given in Fig. 2 .
A. Correctness of the Early Stopping Algorithm
We begin by observing that Lemma 3. 1, whose correctness was proved for the previous protocol, applies to the new one as well. With the following lemma we show that no process may decide on NIL while m is still a potential decision value for an undecided process.
Lemma 4.1: Consider the system of processes at the end of phase R < (t + 1). Let Pi i FAULTY-RECEIV-ERS R be a process which has not decided on m by this time. If there is a process P j which first receives m in phase R, then no process P, has decided on NIL by the end of phase R.
Proof: The result follows from the size of QUIETf as determined by Lemma 3. 1.
D
It is now shown that the contrapositive of Lemma 4.1 is also true. That is, IQUIETfl < R is sufficient to conclude that m is no longer a viable decision value. Proof: Consider any nonfaulty process Pi which has not reached a decision by the end of phase R. The protocol is such that Pi may decide on m in a subsequent phase only if there is some process P, which first receives this value in phase R who will relay it to Pi. Suppose there were such a P j . Then by Lemma 3.1 IQUIET:'~R, a contradiction. Therefore, there is no process able to relay m to any other process in later phases. Hence, no process (nonfaulty or not) decides on m after phase R.
We now show that if P; i FAULTY-RECEIVERS R , then any process which has decided on m by the end of phase R must be faulty. By the preceding paragraph, any pro- For the case when R = (t + 1) we invoke Lemma 3.1 which tells us that if Pi has not decided on m by the end of phase t then there at least t processes in FAULTY-RE-LAYERS t (and hence also in FAULTY-SENDERS t). Because Pi has not received m from these processes they must all have committed send-faults. By assumption this is the maximum number of send-faults which may occur.
Therefore, whatever process P; sent m to Pi in phase (t + 1) cannot commit a send fault. Hence all undecided P, ¢ 1) receive m from P, and reach the same decision as Pi.
FAULTY-RECEIVERS(t+
We now prove that if f < t send-faults actually occur, then all nonfaulty processes halt by the end of phase (f
It is clear from the structure of the protocol that as soon as the first nonfaulty process reaches a decision, then all nonfaulty processes reach the same decision and halt by the end of the next phase.
Suppose Pi is the first nonfaulty process to decide and that it does so at the end of phase R. If decision, = m and there is still a nonfaulty P, which has not decided, then f R by Lemma 3. 1. Thus all nonfaulty processes receive m from Pi by phase (R + 1)~(f + l)Õ n the other hand, suppose decision, = NIL. Because
Pi was the first nonfaulty process to decide, it must be the case that IQUIETfl < Rbut IQUIET~R-l)1~(R -1).
Since Pi is nonfaulty, only those processes which actually committed send-faults with respect to Pi are included in QUIET~R -1). Therefore f~R -1. All nonfaulty process receive NIL from Pi and halt in phase (R + 1)~(f + 2).
The complexity of our early-stopping protocol is now analyzed and compared to previous results. In each phase, a nonfaulty process sends a fixed-length message to all others. Therefore, no more than O(f · n 2 ) message bits are used. This is exactly the complexity of the crash-fault protocol of [5] . Thus, lessening the failure restrictions does not entail additional cost. This contrasts with the protocol of [4] in which admitting a class of failure more restrictive than ours resulted in greater bit complexity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A new model of process failure was presented in this paper. In our model, a faulty process may refuse to send 481 or receive any message called for by the protocol; however, it may not lie. This model subsumes the previouslytreated modes of failure-by-halting and failure-by-omission.
We presented an early-stopping solution to the Byzantine Generals Problem for the new model. In doing so we demonstrated protocols which rendered receive-faults benign.Thus it was shown that only send-faults need be counted in process failures.
Our model is particularly appropriate for dealing with message system faults. Previous work assumed that a lost message could be handled by arbitrarily attributing the loss to a fault of one of the communicating processes. Doing so underestimates resiliency; the immunity of our protocols to receive-faults is proof of this. Hence, our model is more accurate in accounting for lost messages.
